Emons, WinandWinandEmons2024-09-022024-09-022001-12https://boris-portal.unibe.ch/handle/20.500.12422/35168Agents may commit a crime twice. The act is inefficient so that the agents are to be deterred. The agents are wealth constrained so that increasing the fine for the first offense means a reduction in the sanction for the second offense and vice versa. The agents may follow history dependent strategies. The government seeks to minimize the probability of apprehension. The optimal sanction scheme is decreasing rather than increasing in the number of offenses. Indeed, the sanction for the first offense equals the entire wealth while the sanction for the second offense is zero.en300 - Social sciences, sociology & anthropology::330 - Economicsworking_paper10.7892/boris.142429D. Microeconomics::D8 Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty::D82 Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism DesignK. Law and Economics::K4 Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior::K41 Litigation ProcessK. Law and Economics::K4 Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior::K42 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law