Emons, WinandWinandEmonsFluet, ClaudeClaudeFluet2024-10-052024-10-052007-01https://boris-portal.unibe.ch/handle/20.500.12422/55173An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors or he can ask for further evidence from the two parties to the conflict. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. The arbiter is concerned about accuracy and low procedural costs. When both parties testify, each of them distorts the evidence less than when they testify alone. When the fixed cost of testifying is low, the arbiter hears both, for intermediate values one, and for high values no party at all. The arbiter’s ability to remain uninformed as well as sequential testifying makes it more likely that the arbiter requires evidence.en300 - Social sciences, sociology & anthropology::330 - EconomicsAccuracy versus Falsification Costs: The optimal Amount of Evidence under different Proceduresworking_paper10.7892/boris.145692D. Microeconomics::D8 Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty::D82 Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism DesignK. Law and Economics::K4 Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior::K41 Litigation ProcessK. Law and Economics::K4 Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior::K42 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law