Three strikes at a “soft underbelly“? Gallipoli, Italy and Romania in comparison

Abstract

Taking the debates within the historiography of the First World War on the assumptions of military leaders before the war in regard to the duration of a possible great war (Stig Förster, David French, Gerd Krumeich) as a starting point, this presentation wants to focus on the ways three military operations on the Southern borders of the Central Powers, i.e. the amphibious landing of French, British, Australian, New Zealand, Indian and Colonial French forces in Gallipoli in April 1915, the so called “Intervento“ of Italy of May 1915 and last but not least the decision of Romania to join the war in August 1916 came into being. Whereas the decision to attack the Dardanelles trying to force the Ottoman Empire out of the war soon after it had joined, was made by belligerents already at war, in both other cases powers that had decided to keep their neutrality at the beginning of this global conflagration joined the war at moments, in which it had become more than clear that victory would only come at an enormous cost. This contribution therefore wonders what the factors were that brought about military operations on the Southern borders of the Central Powers and to what extent the decision makers were influenced by strategies that claimed that a quick victory was possible, if a firm decision was taken.