Publication:
Entity Realism

cris.virtual.author-orcid0000-0002-9422-2610
cris.virtualsource.author-orciddd3280d2-5916-4297-8d48-9b72bccdf4ef
datacite.rightsmetadata.only
dc.contributor.authorEgg, Matthias
dc.date.accessioned2024-10-25T14:17:47Z
dc.date.available2024-10-25T14:17:47Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.description.abstractThis chapter discusses an approach known as entity realism or experimental realism, which was introduced in the early 1980s by Ian Hacking and Nancy Cartwright and seeks to defend some middle ground between traditional scientific realism and antirealism. I start by introducing Hacking’s version of entity realism, which is based on an argument from manipulability. After responding to some of the criticism that has been directed against this argument, I will turn to Cartwright’s version of entity realism, which is based on a distinction between causal and theoretical explanations. An assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of this approach will pave the way for advertising what I take to be the relevant heritage of entity realism in the contemporary debate on scientific realism.
dc.description.numberOfPages13
dc.description.sponsorshipInstitut für Philosophie
dc.identifier.urihttps://boris-portal.unibe.ch/handle/20.500.12422/159875
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherRoutledge
dc.publisher.placeLondon
dc.relation.isbn978-1-138-88885-2
dc.relation.ispartofbookThe Routledge Handbook on Scientific Realism
dc.relation.organizationDCD5A442BD47E17DE0405C82790C4DE2
dc.relation.organizationDCD5A442BEC4E17DE0405C82790C4DE2
dc.subject.ddc100 - Philosophy
dc.subject.ddc100 - Philosophy::120 - Epistemology
dc.titleEntity Realism
dc.typebook_section
dspace.entity.typePublication
oaire.citation.endPage132
oaire.citation.startPage120
oairecerif.author.affiliationInstitut für Philosophie
unibe.contributor.rolecreator
unibe.description.ispublishedpub
unibe.eprints.legacyId113684
unibe.refereedfalse
unibe.subtype.booksectionchapter

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