Publication:
Strategic Deviations in Optimal Monetary Policy

cris.virtualsource.author-orcid5295f00e-0254-4c9b-aa9f-ae98c8e6dab9
dc.contributor.authorCanetg, Fabio
dc.date.accessioned2024-10-05T11:48:16Z
dc.date.available2024-10-05T11:48:16Z
dc.date.issued2018-07
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates the circumstances under which a central bank is more or less likely to deviate from the optimal monetary policy rule. The research questions is addressed in a simple New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model in which monetary policy deviations occur endogenously. The model solution suggests that higher future central bank credibility attenuates the current period policy trade-off between a stable inflation rate and a stable output gap. Together with the loss of credibility after a policy deviation, this provides the central bank with an incentive to implement past policy commitments. My main result shows that the central bank is willing to implement past policy commitments if a sufficient fraction of agents is not aware of the exact end date of the policy commitment. This finding challenges the time-inconsistency argument against monetary policy commitments and provides a potential explanation for the repeated implementation of monetary policy commitments in reality.
dc.description.numberOfPages58
dc.description.sponsorshipDepartement Volkswirtschaftslehre (VWL)
dc.identifier.doi10.7892/boris.145868
dc.identifier.urihttps://boris-portal.unibe.ch/handle/20.500.12422/55215
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherDepartment of Economics
dc.publisher.placeBern
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion Papers
dc.relation.organizationDCD5A442BCC3E17DE0405C82790C4DE2
dc.subject.ddc300 - Social sciences, sociology & anthropology::330 - Economics
dc.subject.jelE. Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics::E4 Money and Interest Rates::E42 Monetary Systems • Standards • Regimes • Government and the Monetary System • Payment Systems
dc.subject.jelE. Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics::E5 Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit::E52 Monetary Policy
dc.subject.jelE. Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics::E5 Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit::E58 Central Banks and Their Policies
dc.titleStrategic Deviations in Optimal Monetary Policy
dc.typeworking_paper
dspace.entity.typePublication
dspace.file.typetext
oaire.citation.volume18-17
oairecerif.author.affiliationDepartement Volkswirtschaftslehre (VWL)
unibe.contributor.rolecreator
unibe.date.licenseChanged2020-08-17 14:50:55
unibe.description.ispublishedpub
unibe.eprints.legacyId145868
unibe.refereedFALSE

Files

Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Name:
dp1817.pdf
Size:
561.08 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
File Type:
text
License:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Content:
published

Collections