Policy process theories and institutional theories are two foundational strands in political science, both concerned with how people engage in politics. However, they differ in their focus, with policy process theories emphasizing the roles of actors, while institutional theories concentrate on the structures in which these actors are embedded. This paper bridges these two previously isolated strands, exploring how macro‐institutions influence policy processes. Specifically, we investigated how political institutions, such as decentralization and corporatism, relate to coalition opportunity structures (COSs), a key concept within the advocacy coalition framework (ACF); we also investigated the role of minority coalitions and subsystem collaboration. Empirically, we based our analysis on prototypes selected according to Aranda Lijphart's models of majoritarian and consensus democracies. Drawing on existing comparative ACF applications related to climate, water, and energy policy processes, we compared results from these studies to assess the impact of institutional settings on coalition dynamics. Our findings suggest that minority coalitions are more present—and sometimes more influential—in federalist than in unitary countries and that corporatism has a greater effect on collaboration within policy subsystems than consensualism.
