The Political Side of Consociationalism Reconsidered: Switzerland between a Polarized Parliament and Delicate Government Collegiality

This paper builds upon the concept of “coalescent elite behaviour” which is crucial in consociational theory, but contested regarding its actual conceptualization. Contrary to Lijphart's (1968) original assumption that elites are generally committed to an “overarching cooperation”, we hypothesize that institutional venues must be taken in account. Thus, the aim of this paper is twofold: Conceptually, we try to clarify the nature of “amicable agreement” regarding two core institutions (i.e. parliament, government), and regarding executive‐legislative relations. Empirically, we follow a two‐step empirical approach that combines a cross‐time comparison of the decision‐making process regarding the revision of the Swiss basic pension scheme (AHV) with a cross‐case assessment following Fischer's two‐dimensional typology. More generally, our findings serve to inductively refine the “political side” of consociationalism.