Exclusivity Clauses: Enhancing Competition, Raising Prices
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BORIS DOI
Description
In a setting where retailers and suppliers compete for each other by offering binding contracts, exclusivity clauses serve as a competitive device. As a result of these clauses, firms addressed by contracts only accept the most favorable deal. Thus the contract-issuing parties have
to squeeze their final customers and transfer the surplus within the vertical supply chain. We elaborate to what extent the resulting allocation depends on the sequence of play and discuss the implications of a ban on exclusivity clauses
to squeeze their final customers and transfer the surplus within the vertical supply chain. We elaborate to what extent the resulting allocation depends on the sequence of play and discuss the implications of a ban on exclusivity clauses
Date of Publication
2013-11
Publication Type
Working Paper
Language(s)
en
Additional Credits
Publisher
Department of Economics
Access(Rights)
open.access