Lässt sich die Induktion doch rechtfertigen? Eine kritische Diskussion von neuen Ansätzen zum Induktionsproblem

This paper discusses recent attempts to solve the problem of induction. Two broad strategies to escape Hume’s fork can be distinguished. The first tries to localize the justification of specific inductions in uncontroversial empirical knowledge, e. g. mundane scientific knowledge (J. D. Norton) or perception (M. Lange). I argue that related attempts to (dis)solve the problem fail. The second strategy tries to put forward an argument in favor of induction. As a discussion of work by R. White shows, this argument can barely prove that induction is reliable or at least not unreliable. But D. Steel, F. Huber and G. Schurz could show that enumerative induction is necessary and sufficient for a certain epistemic goal or optimal in a certain sense. These proofs, however, only solve the problem of induction if the goal or a certain standard has priority over the avoidance of error. This suggests that the difficulties to justify induction do not so much derive from Hume’s fork, but rather from a plurality of sensible epistemic goals that can conflict with each other.