Explication as a basis for conceptual pluralism
Publisher DOI
Abstract
It is generally recognized that there is no such thing as the correct explication of a given concept, but only one or more adequate explications. This paper addresses two questions: In what ways can there be more than one solution to a task of explication? And in what sense and under what conditions can diverse solutions give rise to conceptual pluralism? Based on an analysis of the general structure of explications, I first develop a systematic overview of the factors that may be responsible for diverse outcomes in a task of explication. I then suggest conditions under which it is plausible to interpret diverse outcomes as giving rise to explication-based pluralism. The rest of the paper discusses various ways in which explications can actually lead to explication-based pluralism.
Date Issued
2026-02-16
Publication Type
Article
Subject(s)
Author(s)
Additional Credits
Journal
Inquiry
Publisher
Taylor and Francis Group
ISSN
0020-174X
1502-3923
Access(Rights)
open.access