Cooperation preferences and framing effects
Abstract
This paper presents the results from an experiment investigating whether framing a§ects the elicitation and predictive power of preferences for cooperation, i.e., the willingness to cooperate with others. Cooperation preferences are elicited in three treatments using the method of Fischbacher, G‰chter and Fehr (2001). The treatments vary two features of their method: the sequence and order in which the contributions of other group members are presented. The predictive power of the elicited preferences is evaluated in a one-shot and a Önitely-repeated public-good game. I Önd that the order in which the contributions of others are presented, by and large, has no impact on the elicited preferences and their predictive power. In contrast, presenting the contributions of others in a sequence has a pronounced e§ect on the elicited preferences and reduces substantially their predictive power. Overall, elicited preferences are more accurate at predicting behavior when othersícontributions are presented simultaneously and in ascending order, like in Fischbacher, G‰chter and Fehr (2001).
Date Issued
2013-02
Publication Type
Working Paper
Language(s)
en
Additional Credits
Publisher
Department of Economics
Access(Rights)
open.access