Reasoning and normative beliefs: not too sophisticated
Official URL
Publisher DOI
Abstract
Does reasoning to a certain conclusion necessarily involve a normative belief in support of that conclusion? In many recent discussions of the nature of reasoning, such a normative belief condition is rejected. One main objection is that it requires too much conceptual sophistication and thereby excludes certain reasoners, such as small children. I argue that this objection is mistaken. Its advocates overestimate what is necessary for grasping the normative concepts required by the condition, while seriously underestimating the importance of such concepts for our most fundamental agential capacities. Underlying the objection is the observation that normative thoughts do not necessarily cross our minds during reasoning. I show that proponents of the normative belief condition can accommodate this observation by taking the required normative belief to guide the reasoning process and offer a novel account of what such guidance consists in.
Date Issued
2019
Publication Type
Article
Language(s)
en
Author(s)
Additional Credits
Journal
Philosophical Explorations
Publisher
Taylor & Francis
ISSN
1741-5918
Related URL(s)
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13869795.2018.1523449
Access(Rights)
restricted