How federalism influences welfare spending: Belgium federalism reform through the perspective of the synthetic control method
Publisher DOI
Abstract
The question of whether and how federalism influences a country's welfare state has been a longstanding concern of political scientists. However, no agreement exists on exactly how, and under what conditions, federal structures impact the welfare state. This article examines this controversy. It concludes theoretically that the specific constellation of federal structures and distribution of powers need to be considered when theorising the effects of federalism on the welfare state. Using the case of Belgium and applying the synthetic control method, it is shown in the article that without the federalism reform of 1993, the country would have had further decreases in social spending rather than a consolidation of this spending in the years after 1993. In the case of Belgium, the combination of increased subnational spending autonomy in a still national financing system provided ideal conditions for a positive federalism effect on social spending to occur.
Date Issued
2017-03-17
Publication Type
Article
Subjects
Belgien
•
Föderalismus
•
Wohlfahrtsstaat
Language(s)
en
Additional Credits
Journal
European journal of political research
Publisher
Blackwell Publishing
ISSN
0304-4130
Access(Rights)
open.access