Constructing Practical Reasons
Publisher DOI
Abstract
Some things are reasons for us to perform certain actions. That it will spare you great pain in the future, for example, is a reason for you to go to the dentist now, and that you are already late for work is a reason for you not to read the next article in the morning paper. Why are such considerations reasons for or against certain actions? Constructivism offers an intriguing answer to this question. Its basic idea is often encapsulated in the slogan that reasons are not discovered but made by us. This book elaborates the constructivist idea into a fully fledged account of practical reasons, makes its theoretical commitments explicit, and defends it against some well-known objections. It begins with an examination of the distinctive role that reason judgements play in the process of practical reasoning. This provides the resources for an anti-representationalist conception of the nature of those judgements, according to which they are true, if they are true, not because they accurately represent certain normative facts, but because of their role in sound reasoning. On the resulting view, a consideration owes its status as a reason to the truth of the corresponding reason judgement and thus, ultimately, to the soundness of a certain episode of reasoning. Consequently, our practical reasons exhibit a kind of mind-dependence, but this does not force us to deny their objectivity.
Date Issued
2020
Publication Type
Book
Subjects
constructivism
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practical reason
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reasoning
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reason judgement
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anti-representationalism
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mind-dependence
Language(s)
en
Author(s)
Additional Credits
Publisher
Oxford University Press
ISBN
9780198754329
Related URL(s)
https://global.oup.com/academic/product/constructing-practical-reasons-9780198754329
Access(Rights)
metadata.only