The private solution trap in collective action problems across 34 nations.

DOI
Publisher DOI
PubMed ID
41860966
Abstract
Collective action problems emerge when individual incentives and group interests are misaligned, as in the case of climate change. Individuals involved in these problems are generally considered to have two options: contribute toward public solutions such as global warming mitigation or free ride. However, many collective action problems today involve a third option of investing in a "private solution" such as local adaptation. The availability of this third option can lead to a private solution trap whereby private solutions are adopted, collectively optimal public solutions are not provided, and existing inequalities are exacerbated. We investigated the private solution trap with a collective action game featuring private and public solutions, wealth inequality determined by luck or merit, and participants from 34 countries. We found that the joint existence of private solutions and wealth inequality had a consistent effect across countries: Participants given a higher endowment adopted private solutions almost twice as often as those given a lower endowment, regardless of whether it was determined by luck or merit, and contributed proportionally less toward public solutions. Wealth inequality increased in every country and those given lower endowments were often left unprotected as public solutions were not provided. Across countries, cultural values of hierarchy and harmony were associated with preferences for private and public solutions, respectively. We also identified two universal pathways toward public solution provision: early contributions and conditional cooperation. Our findings highlight the ubiquity of the private solution trap, its cultural underpinnings, and its potential consequences for global collective action problems.
Date Issued
2026-03-24
Publication Type
Article
Subject(s)
Subjects
climate change
•
cross-cultural study
•
human cooperation
•
private solutions
•
social dilemma
Language(s)
en
Author(s)
Malthouse, Eugene
Pilgrim, Charlie
Sgroi, Daniel
Accerenzi, Michela
Alfonso, Antonio
Ashraf, Rana Umair
Baard, Max
Banerjee, Sanchayan
Belianin, Alexis
Bhattacharjee, Swagata
Bhattacharya, Mihir
Brañas-Garza, Pablo
Cárdenas, Juan-Camilo
Carriquiry, Miguel
Choi, Syngjoo
Clochard, Gwen-Jiro
Denzon, Eduardo Ezekiel
Dessoulavy-Sliwinski, Bartlomiej
Dini, Giorgio
Dong, Lu
Ertl, Antal
Exadaktylos, Filippos
Filiz-Ozbay, Emel
Flecke, Sarah Lynn
Galeotti, Fabio
Garcia-Muñoz, Teresa
Hanaki, Nobuyuki
Hollard, Guillaume
Horn, Daniel
Huang, Lingbo
İriş, Doruk
Kiss, Hubert Janos
Koch, Juliane
Kovářík, Jaromír
Kwarteng, Osbert Kwabena Boadi
Lange, Andreas
Leites, Martin
Leung, Thomas Ho-Fung
Lim, Wooyoung
Morren, Meike
Nockur, Laila
Okyere, Charles Yaw
Oudah, Mayada
Ozkes, Ali I
Page, Lionel
Park, Junghyun
Pfattheicher, Stefan
Proestakis, Antonios
Ramos, Carlos
Ramos-Sosa, Mapi
Ashraf, Muhammad Saeed
Sanjaya, Muhammad Ryan
Schwaiger, Rene
Sene, Omar
Song, Fei
Staněk, Rostislav
Tanchingco, Norman
Tavoni, Alessandro
Te Velde, Vera
Vázquez-De Francisco, María José
Visser, Martine
Wang, Joseph Tao-Yi
Wang, Willy
Weng, Wei-Chien
Werner, Katharina
Wijayanti, Amanda
Wooders, John
Ying, Li
Zhen, Wei
Hills, Thomas
Additional Credits
Journal
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Publisher
National Academy of Sciences
ISSN
1091-6490
0027-8424
Access(Rights)
open.access
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